Why did European nations struggle to coordinate a common defense in the early 1950s?
Despite the swift implementation of NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Defense Community (EDC) and the Western European Union failed to achieve immediate cohesion among European forces in the face of looming international crises. The complexity of this challenge stemmed from the interplay of national identities, military capabilities, and diverse cultural and economic fabrics.
For Italy, which had just emerged from the lengthy post-war peace negotiations, clearly defining its national interests abroad remained a demanding task (Mammarella 192).
The EDC represented an additional test, exposing Italy to the risk of a new Franco-German hegemony while potentially alienating its privileged relationship with the United States—the so-called “special relationship”. In January 1950, an Italo-American bilateral treaty reaffirmed the strategic importance of this alliance, symbolically rewarding Italy’s budgetary efforts following its recent entry into NATO. However, for Italy, this was not sufficient.
Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza had already outlined Italy’s vision for an integrated European army in a memorandum sent to U.S. Ambassador James Dunn in May 1950. Given the outbreak of the Korean War, the reintegration of Germany into Europe’s defense forces became an urgent necessity, and Italy sought to anticipate this development.
France, however, was unwilling to grant German troops full integration. In the Pleven Plan, German military units were relegated to a quasi-mercenary status, a condition that was unacceptable to Adenauer’s Germany.
Moreover, through both the ECSC and the EDC, France aimed to assert control over German forces—an objective shaped by historical concerns, particularly the issue of the Rhineland in the aftermath of World War I. The Rapport Intérimaire explicitly underscored the predominance of the French and German governments within both the European Community and the transatlantic relationship with the United States.
From an Italian perspective, this situation was perceived as a diplomatic setback. While Germany was being reintegrated into Europe with full economic rehabilitation, Italy had been largely sidelined.
Italian diplomats, including Ambassadors Quaroni and Grazzi, expressed concerns about the economic risks of a Franco-German customs union, which could disadvantage Italy’s steel industry. Grazzi, as Director General for Economic Affairs, acknowledged these risks but advocated for a diplomatic strategy that would align Italy’s accession with broader efforts to strengthen relations with France.
This approach was reinforced by Italy’s insistence on playing a full and equal role in the Schuman Plan negotiations rather than being relegated behind the Benelux countries. French diplomat Alphand himself recognized the necessity of Italy’s immediate inclusion in the negotiations (Varsori 2022: 141).
The ECSC negotiations commenced on June 20, 1950, focusing on defining the powers of the High Authority, the supranational body overseeing the ECSC. Alongside this institution, an Assembly was established to ensure democratic oversight. Italy was particularly concerned about the inclusion of iron ore and scrap metal within the agreement, as these resources were crucial to its steel industry. It was at this stage that national interests began to diverge, just as the member states were embarking on their self-definition as “Europeans.”
The concerns of the Benelux countries resulted in the creation of additional institutions, such as the Council and the Court of Justice, which Italy viewed favorably. These bodies provided a legal foundation for Italy’s negotiating demands, including a transitional period of exemptions for its steel industry and the extension of the agreement to Algeria, a key supplier of iron ore to Italy. However, Italy was granted only one seat in the High Authority, while other powers received two each. This imbalance was further exacerbated by the lack of provisions ensuring employment opportunities for Italian migrant workers. Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty facilitated the free movement of qualified workers within Europe, but this effectively excluded many Italian laborers seeking employment abroad.
These factors contributed to Italy’s skepticism toward the EDC throughout the negotiations, which had formally begun with the ECSC on February 15, 1951. Italy was also the last country to ratify the ECSC Treaty. Its hesitation in ratifying the EDC Treaty (May 27, 1952) was a clear indication of its lingering doubts. Additionally, the prospect of standardized European salaries for Italian military personnel under the EDC raised concerns about potential wage inflation and long-term economic instability.
Moreover, the idea of a military union preceding a political, ideological, and value-based union conflicted with the European federalist vision championed by Altiero Spinelli and supported by Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi. Italy’s federalist stance was reflected in the inclusion of Article 38 in the EDC Treaty, which called for the establishment of a European political union through a parliamentary assembly, developing in parallel with the EDC. This federalist orientation was further underscored by the appointment of Ivan Matteo Lombardo as head of the Italian delegation in October 1951. Under the influence of Spinelli and De Gasperi—who had visited the United States in September 1951—Lombardo presented a memorandum strongly advocating for federalist principles.
By 1954, Anglo-American pressure on the French government to ratify the EDC Treaty was overshadowed by France’s primary concern: the crisis in Indochina. Italy’s hesitation, prompted by France’s shifting priorities, irritated the United States. At the same time, European politics were heavily influenced by the rise of the Partisans of Peace movement, which gained traction among leftist parties in both Italy and France (Varsori 1998: 96). Despite the security concerns raised by the Korean War and the unresolved German question, pressing national issues took precedence—Indochina for France and Trieste for Italy.
The failure of the EDC deeply concerned Italy, as it effectively nullified the prospect of a European Political Community—a diplomatic effort enshrined in Article 38. Instead of reinvigorating efforts to establish a strategic and political European unity, national interests prevailed, leading to diplomatic inertia. Domestic political developments also played a role: De Gasperi’s government was preoccupied with controversies surrounding Italy’s electoral reform, delaying parliamentary ratification of the treaty. In France, the appointment of Georges Bidault as Foreign Minister in 1953 signaled a shift in policy. Although supportive of the EDC, Bidault was wary of excessive supranationalism and opposed the simultaneous creation of a common European political framework, as advocated by the Italian delegation. Meanwhile, the Italian government, under Giuseppe Pella, was more focused on securing Anglo-American attention on the Trieste issue than on advancing European integration. Ultimately, by attempting to link EDC ratification to the resolution of the Trieste dispute, Italy inadvertently contributed to the failure of the EDC.
Seventy-Five Years Later: Rearm Europe—Towards a European Army?
Between February and March 2025, in the midst of a tumultuous sequence of high-stakes meetings and heated diplomatic exchanges over the Ukraine crisis, the European Commission unveiled the Rearm Europe plan. The imposition of 25% tariffs on Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and the European Union, coupled with the United States’ growing political and military disengagement from European security matters amid the Russo-Ukrainian war, propelled the EU toward a renewed defense initiative.
Following bilateral meetings between Macron and Trump, Starmer and Trump, and Zelensky and Trump, as well as an emergency summit in London reaffirming support for Ukraine, Europe reached what many leaders and analysts described as a “historic turning point.”
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and even Turkey expressed readiness to deploy troops for peacekeeping operations in Ukraine.
Italy, however, opted for a different stance—maintaining an equidistant position. Rome decided not to commit Italian forces to the peacekeeping contingent, instead prioritizing the rapid restoration of its strategic ties with the United States to prevent further fragmentation of the Western alliance. Preserving the Italo-American special relationship has remained a cornerstone of Italy’s foreign policy, consistent with its historical diplomatic approach.
In this context, Italian diplomacy could play a crucial role as a bridge between an increasingly divided Europe and the United States. In the next article, we will examine the European shift in greater detail, analyzing the speeches of key leaders and their impact on public opinion in the United States, Europe, and beyond.
Silvio Magnolo
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References
• Mammarella, Giuseppe, and Paolo Cacace (2006). La politica estera dell’Italia. Dallo Stato unitario ai giorni nostri. Laterza.
• Varsori, Antonio (1998). L’Italia nelle Relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992. Laterza.
• Varsori, Antonio (2022). Dalla Rinascita al declino. Storia internazionale dell’Italia repubblicana. Il Mulino.
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